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ABSTRACT: 
The idea of permit trading in the United States can be traced as far back as the 1970s, but emissions trading has 
really only became a popular and exportable idea with the more recent demands that environmental protection 
acknowledge economic pressures through such ideas as sustainable development. Now the idea of emissions 
trading has caught on in South America, China and Europe as well. Yet in the eagerness of governments and 
industry to work out the technical details and legal mechanics of the emissions trading tool, insufficient 
attention has been paid to its underlying legal and ethical assumptions. In this article, it is emphasized that 
emissions trading is a part of compliance with environmental law, not a market alternative to compliance. The 
difference between the two greatly effects and is affected by theories of rights. As part of the scheme of rights 
and accompanying duties, the author questions whether an implicit right to pollute has been created through 
emissions trading, as exemplified by the comparison of the systems in the U.S., China and Europe. 
INTRODUCTION--WHENCE THE RIGHT TO CLEAN AIR? 
If one begins to reflect upon the idea of pollution credits trading in the here and now, with many countries doing 
it, with the International *150 systems of the Kyoto Protocol and the European Trading System having just 
come on line in 2005, and with the programs in the United States and elsewhere having gone beyond air 
pollution credit trading to water pollution credit trading and more, it might seem that pollution credit trading is 
ubiquitous and has always and already been with us. Ubiquity alone, however, is not persuasive. The breadth 
and depth of abhorrent practices such as slavery, for instance, or treating women as chattel property, have 
marked much of human history and might have convinced people that these practices would always be with us. 
Ubiquity might also suggest that the practice must be a good idea; otherwise everyone would not be doing it. 
Moreover, legal systems both domestic and international recognized and protected slave trade and the treatment 
of women as chattel, although many cultures today would abhor those practices and genuinely wonder how they 
could ever have been considered legal, let alone ethical. This article analyses the ethical bases, both explicit and 
implicit, that are posited to support the legal establishment and maintenance of pollution credit trading. 
CURRENT EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS 
The past twenty years have seen many countries in the world institute various schemes of emissions trading, 
whereby compliance with pre-existing duties not to pollute is regarded as a positive property right that can be 
bought and sold on the market. In general terms, “emissions trading” has been defined as: 
The creation of surplus emission reductions at certain stacks, vents or similar emissions sources 
and the use of this surplus to meet or redefine pollution requirements applicable to other 
emissions sources. This allows one source to increase emissions when another source reduces 
them, maintaining an overall constant emission level. Facilities that reduce emissions 
substantially may “bank” their “credits” or sell them to other facilities or industries.1 
While the concept of trading pollution rights has been extended to water pollution2 and several spheres of air 
pollution,3 for purposes of this article, one needs only to look at the oldest of the systems--those for air 
pollutants, and within them, the representative programs related to acid rain and climate change. Critics and 
proponents alike distinguish between two different types of trading programs. Byron *151 Swift, director of the 
Center for Energy and Innovation at the Environmental Law Institute, neatly summarizes the distinctions as 
  
follows: “Emissions cap-and-allowance trading programs impose both a strict regulatory standard that reduces 
pollution--a permanent cap on the amount of allowable emissions--as well as an allowance-trading program,”4 
whereas “emissions credit trading programs are grafted onto existing regulatory programs, and allow sources 
that emit below their baseline levels to trade the resulting credits once they receive regulatory approval.”5 In 
Swift’s estimation, the former has been very successful, having led to “major emissions reductions at low cost,” 
whereas the latter “have failed to result in much trading or regulatory benefit.”6 
In 1992, when the United States had first put the emissions trading market into law, in a comic strip called 
“Tom the Dancing Bug,” Ruben Bolling satirized the U.S. Clean Air Act (“C.A.A.”) Amendments that 
permitted emissions trading with an enduring 1940s-style crime story called “Tales of Market-Driven Crimes.”7 
In it, the fictional protagonist Martin Ryder is awakened by an intruder into his home. Announcing that he fears 
for his life, Martin notes that he has a right therefore to kill the intruder with the pistol that he keeps in his 
nightstand. But he has a better idea. He phones “Crimebrokers” to sell his justifiable homicide. The broker at 
the Crimebrokers’ switchboard quotes the price of thirty thousand dollars to Martin, a price to which he agrees. 
Martin then lets the intruder leave his house, rather than killing him. 
Meanwhile, on the other side of town, pinstriped gangsters are in the act of murdering someone in a bar. Before 
they complete the murder, they too phone Crimebrokers, and fortuitously find that the agency has a murder for 
sale for thirty thousand dollars. They buy the justifiable homicide that Martin has just sold, thus comfortably 
completing their murder without fear of retribution, simply by paying Crimebrokers thirty thousand dollars. The 
final frame shows Martin again peacefully sleeping, with the caption “The same number of deaths result, but 
with a more efficient allocation. Another happy outcome, when crimes are market driven!” 
One of the reasons that the black humor of Bolling’s cartoon is effective is because we like to think that society 
would never provide an extra reward for individuals who simply fail to violate proscriptions or otherwise 
comply with pre-existing legal duties. In contract law, for instance, it is well-established that compliance with a 
pre-existing duty, *152 established by agreement or legislation, cannot constitute consideration in support of a 
contract.8 And yet, when it comes to emissions trading, we provide extra reward to persons for their compliance 
with the pre-existing duty not to pollute. Surprising the reader with this apparent contradiction, Bolling’s 
cartoon questions not only the difference between compliance with the pre-existing duties not to murder or 
pollute, but also questions the notion that such compliance can create a right for sale. 
Several qualifications must be stated in order to keep the social commentary of the cartoon legally clear. First is 
the issue of fungibility. Murder is not fungible. Even exceeding the speed limit while driving is not a fungible 
act. And while global warming may be fungible as to its effects, it is not fungible as to its causes any more than 
murder or speeding. The second issue is the distinction between criminal and civil liability. Civil law often 
tolerates conflicting norms and the legal system must be accessed to adjudicate between or among these 
conflicting norms, whereas criminal concretizes one norm for any given area of human activity. 
In an era when businesses like Enron shift their raison d’etre from the production of energy to the invention of 
abstractions for value, and when eighty-five percent of the Standard and Poors 500 market capitalization assets 
are intangible as opposed to tangible,9 it is not idealistic tree-hugging to question the ethical basis for the 
creation of value in compliance with a pre-existing duty. How might one do this in an informed and methodical 
fashion? As an issue of applied ethics, one can best answer this question by examining the particular facts of the 
issue in question to determine the appropriate ethical frames of analysis.10 
A. The United States’ Emissions Trading Program 
Among the various emissions trading systems in place in the world, it is important to focus upon the U.S. 
systems because, as the oldest, they have influenced the systems of other countries as well as international 
systems. The idea of permit trading can be said to have begun in the United States as long ago as 1960.11 But it 
was not until the C.A.A. Amendments of 1977 that the U.S. began permitting “open market” credit trading for 
criteria pollutants. When it came time to *153 create the tradable permit allowances under the C.A.A., Congress 
wrote: 
An allowance under this title is a limited authorization to emit sulfur dioxide. . . . . . . Such 
allowance does not constitute a property right.12 The environmental community, on the other 
hand, has just as consistently argued that the air belongs to the people and it, as a matter of 
ethics, should not become private property. According to this view the ends cannot justify the 
  
transfer of a community right into a private one; the right to a reasonable level of clean air is 
seen as inalienable. The practical resolution of this matter involved providing some security to 
the permit holders, while making it clear that it was not a property right.13 
Of course, one must question whether a simple unilateral declaration that a property right is not established is 
sufficient to prevent the right from being recognized de facto.14 Without a legal right to pollute, there cannot be 
an ethical foundation to emissions trading. Today’s type of emissions trading, brought about by the C.A.A. 
Amendments of 1977, are among a set of what Byron Swift and others term “market-incentive” policies 
established by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“E.P.A.”), and which include bubbles, 
netting and offsets.15 
The United States did not begin market trading of carbon emissions until the passage of the 1990 C.A.A. 
Amendments.16 Thereafter, in September of 2000, China also established a program for trading sulfur emissions 
nationally and carbon emissions internationally. And most recently, in 2005, the European Union brought to life 
its own emissions trading program as a method of implementing the mandates of the Kyoto Protocol. This 
article will consider as examples the United States’ C.A.A. system, the Chinese Emissions Trading System, and 
the European Union Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme (“E.U.E.T.S.”). These three systems have 
been selected because they present a spectrum of public legal construction ranging from the *154 purely 
domestic sovereignty of the United States’ system, to the partial sovereignty of the European Union, to the 
Chinese dual system of a domestic sulfur emission-trading system coupled with an international carbon-trading 
system. 
Considering the three examples chronologically, of the United States, China and the European Union as they 
established emissions-trading systems, it is worth noting that the United States’ system was put in place before 
the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated. As such, the United States’ system was put in place without any suggestion 
of trading emissions internationally or within an international legal framework. The 1977 Amendments to the 
C.A.A. established an emissions credit trading system and the 1990 Amendments to the C.A.A. established a 
cap-and-trade system that authorized the E.P.A. to put a cap on the amount of sulfur dioxide (SO2) that a 
fossil-fueled plant was permitted to emit. 
Thus the United States brought a track record in both systems--emissions credit trading and cap-and-trade to the 
table when it sat down to negotiate the Kyoto Protocol.17 Before the Bush administration withdrew from the 
Protocol, the United States insisted upon several flexibility mechanisms, including an emissions trading system, 
before it would consider observing the Protocol.18 
At this point, compliance with the Kyoto Protocol in the United States remains voluntary, even though the 
Protocol is now law for all signatory countries, after Russia’s accession pushed the number of countries and 
quantity of emissions over the threshold required to trigger the Protocol’s requirements.19 In addition to the 
emissions credit trading and cap and trade systems already in place in the United States, the voluntary system 
includes several networks of emission reduction organizations, including public-private partnerships and private 
exchange groups.20 
While one might say that the U.S., being first, has provided a model as to how emissions trading can be done, 
discussions around the Kyoto Protocol go further to provide the legal reasons as to why it might be done, for 
countries like China, for instance, as well as for the European Union. The Protocol includes several flexibility 
mechanisms, including emissions trading, which are properly characterized as “market-based” and designed to 
help countries or companies lower the cost of reducing their greenhouse gas emissions. According to United 
States Information Agency science writer Jim Fuller, these *155 mechanisms were modeled after U.S. efforts to 
reduce levels of SO2 and lead spewed from power plants.21 The U.S. therefore needs to be considered for its 
efforts outside its own borders as well. 
As associate director of the International Affairs Office of Air and Radiation at the U.S. E.P.A., Jennifer 
Macedonia reported that several countries had set up procedures for domestic trading programs to reduce 
greenhouse gases modeled after what she called the “highly successful U.S. acid rain program.” In a 1998 
interview, Macedonia opined that “New Zealand, Australia, Denmark, the United Kingdom and Norway are the 
countries that are farthest along in their domestic trading proposals--and I think Canada is planning to do 
something similar.” Anticipating China’s 2000 program, she added “We’ve also gotten interest from China to 
do domestic trading to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions-- so I think there are a lot of people who are trying to 
apply the same model.”22 
Although the United States has failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, individual states have taken actions that 
  
either expressly or tacitly serve to fulfill its mandates.23 For instance, in 2003, New York State proposed and 
attained commitments from nine Northeast U.S. states to cap and trade carbon dioxide emissions. Since then, 
those states, led by New York governor George Pataki, who openly disagreed with President Bush’s anti-Kyoto 
Protocol policy, have agreed to cut power plant emissions.24 Another potential emission trade project involves 
the purchase by the Netherlands of carbon dioxide credits from a United States electric utility’s program that 
captures methane at a landfill in New Jersey.25 The authors of that agreement, former Commissioner of the New 
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (N.J. D.E.P.) Robert Shinn and Counsel to the N.J.D.E.P. 
Matthew Polsky, report that “part of the purpose for each party [is] to gain experience in emissions trading for 
expanding use in the future if and when global trading becomes a more commonplace means of addressing 
global warming.”26 It has also been observed that if the Kyoto emission trading system were to shift from 
providing the privilege to trade, to providing private enterprise the privilege to trade, “such a scheme would 
work only if the participating states agree on establishing *156 a kind of transnational permit trading system, 
comparable to the two systems which exist in the United States.”27 
B. Emissions Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (U.N.F.C.C.C.)28 as supplemented by the 
Kyoto Protocol29 has been called “the most complex international regulatory regime created so far.”30 Among 
the three systems being considered here, only the United States’ system of emissions trading preceded the 
signing of the Kyoto Protocol. This timing is significant insofar as the Kyoto Protocol provides for what came 
to be known as “flexibility mechanisms”31 for compliance with the Protocol’s Article 3 mandates. Economists 
and some lawyers have been quick to add the prefix “market based” to the term “flexibility mechanisms.”32 
Even though it subsequently withdrew, it was the United States that pushed for emissions trading to be included 
in the Kyoto Protocol.33 
While one flexibility mechanism is emissions trading, the other two are known as Joint Implementation and the 
Clean Development Mechanism. The Kyoto Protocol‘s emissions trading flexibility mechanism is similar to 
that constructed by the United States’ 1990 Amendments to the C.A.A. . Internationally, the U.N.F.C.C.C. sets 
caps for each nation. According to the Protocol, nations that emit less than their quota of greenhouse gases will 
be able to sell emissions credits to polluting nations. Article 17 of the Protocol states: 
The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and 
guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading. The 
Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the purpose of fulfilling 
their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions 
for the purpose of meeting quantified emission *157 limitation and reduction commitments 
under that Article.34 
Notably, “all these ‘economic’ instruments have in common the fact that they do not constitute pure market 
instruments, as there is no natural market. Like all markets, the emissions-trading market is created by law, and 
is thus an artificial market.”35 Even here, it must be noted that the apparent dichotomy of “natural market” and 
“artificial market” is false. There is no such thing as a natural market. Even in the simplest example of barter, 
the parties need to have some idea of the rules of exchange in order to conduct the barter. Those rules are not 
rules that each has invented on his or her own, but rather they are rules understood from the context of having 
observed or having been persuaded of the operation of the rules. That said, one may therefore distinguish 
expressed or explicit rules that establish or control a market from those that are implied or implicit, but these 
categories alone are not sufficient to support claims to “natural” or “artificial” markets. 
Some commentators have suggested that because emissions trading under Article 17 is supplemental to Article 
3 requirements, “any such trading does not bestow rights or entitlements to Annex B parties.”36 That alone 
would not deny the status of the property value that is created for polluters from being characterized as a right. 
As Don Brown has observed, under some versions of rules pushed by the United States, “the Kyoto Protocol 
trading mechanisms can be understood to create property rights in the use of the global commons. This is so 
because credits received by those financing carbon reduction projects in other nations are classified as 
‘entitlements’ by the Kyoto Protocol and apparently create rights . . . .”37 Moreover, given that Article 3 does 
not set a baseline for compliance, the Article 17 “supplements” can be used to supplement from zero on up to 
the permitted limit. 
  
After first suggesting that global warming was not occuring,38 and then arguing as recently as January 2005 that 
humans make no contribution to it,39 conservative American critics have finally come around to acknowledging 
that global warming exists, and that human activities *158 cause it.40 With that admission, U.S. critics are left 
with no alternative but to admit that their real concerns are economic. Critics of the Kyoto Protocol say that it is 
a means of redistributing wealth from the United States to the developing world. This is because the U.S., which 
produces twenty-five per cent of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions, would likely exceed its quota and 
subsequently have to buy emissions credits from nations such as China, India or Russia. 
China’s Emissions Trading Program 
As a developing country under Annex II of the Kyoto Protocol, China may not yet be required to meet Kyoto 
Protocol emissions limits; however, it has already enacted legislation that is not inconsistent with Kyoto 
Protocol requirements, including establishing both domestic and international trading mechanisms. China began 
its program in September 2000 with an Amendment to the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law.41 This 
amendment provided a legal foundation for Total Emissions Control (T.E.C.). The T.E.C. policy is combined 
with emissions trading to reduce SO2 emissions. These T.E.C. policies were also highlighted in China’s Tenth 
Five Year Plan (2001-2005). That plan advocates “a 10% reduction in SO2 from year 2000 levels, . . . and 
reductions of 20% from year 2000 levels in two highlighted ‘control zones’ in eastern and southern China.”42 
Working under a general five-year framework in 2002, the U.S.-based non-governmental organization 
(“N.G.O.”) Environmental Defense Fund (“E.D.F.”) began a pilot emissions trading program with the Chinese 
State Environmental Protection Agency (“S.E.P.A.”). So far, China has established a domestic plan for SO2 
emissions trading to cut SO2 emissions by between 2000 and 2005. China’s first SO2 emissions trading 
agreement between two plants in different cities came into effect in July 2003. The Chinese central government 
is now preparing a blueprint in various areas, including the Yangtze River Delta, during its eleventh Five Year 
Plan period (2006- 2011).43 
In addition to the E.D.F.’s involvement, the U.S. E.P.A. has been actively involved in providing technical 
assistance for these projects. According to the U.S. E.P.A., in order for regional or national trading to be 
successful beyond the pilot phase, China must build and strengthen monitoring and assessment capabilities. 
China also needs *159 tracking and registration systems and national databases of industrial emissions data.44 
The Kyoto signatories have already begun negotiations with developing countries like China to establish a 
post-2012 greenhouse gas emission regime. It remains to be seen whether China will agree to reduction targets 
in the post-2012 period.45 
The European Union Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme 
The E.U. E.T.S. is the largest multi-national, greenhouse gas emissions trading system in the world. In 
compliance with Directive 2003/87/EC, the system commenced operation in January 2005 with all twenty-five 
member states of the European Union participating. As a unique public legal entity that holds some of the 
sovereignty of its twenty-five member states, without itself being a sovereign state, the European Union has 
treaty capacity and has acceded to the Kyoto Protocol. Under the European Union emissions trading 
Directive,46 the emission reductions targets of the Kyoto Protocol are to be observed, but may vary from 
member state to member state.47 The overall European Union target is an eight percent reduction, but while 
Germany has a reduction target of over twenty percent, and Austria and the United Kingdom of over ten 
percent, Ireland for example can in fact increase emissions.48 Emitters covered by this trading scheme need a 
permit for their carbon emissions, and must surrender an allowance for each ton of carbon that is emitted.49 The 
individual member states allocate the freely-tradable allowances.50 The total number of allowances that each 
member state may distribute is limited by each state’s obligation under the Kyoto Protocol to reduce 
emissions.51 This first-ever multinational emissions trading system allows emissions from 12,000 installations 
across the E.U.’s twenty-five countries to be traded. Some business estimates that the subsequent management 
and trading of these allowances is expected to create a market worth one billion Euros in 2005, and perhaps as 
much as six billion Euros by the year 2008.52 Emissions trading may be available to thousands of companies 
across Europe, but whether a right or even an ethical foundation exists for this positive law, is ignored or 
forgotten. In fact, *160 some international practitioners doubt whether this trading scheme even meets the 
requirements of the E.U.’s fundamental rights, and expect national and local courts to be called upon to decide 
that issue.53 
THE CATALOGUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 
  
A. International 
Part I of the United Nations Environmental Programme’s (U.N.E.P.) Programme for the Development and 
Periodic Review of Environmental Law for the First Decade of the Twenty-First Century, entitled 
“Effectiveness of Environmental Law,”54 begins with a section called “Implementation, Compliance, and 
Enforcement.” Section 9 of Part I is entitled “Innovative Approaches to Environmental Law,” and therein, one 
finds a recommended action to “[a]ssess state practice in utilizing tools such as . . . emissions trading. . . .”55 
This seemingly simple and general policy statement both properly characterizes emission trading as a state tool 
for implementation, compliance and enforcement, and sets its context for public policy: emissions trading fits 
into the strategy of “innovative approaches, tools and mechanisms that will improve the effectiveness of the 
law.”56 It is not a market-determined alternative to the law, but a tool within the law. For example, the Kyoto 
Protocol, among other international sources, also characterizes emissions trading as a supplemental method of 
compliance in its Article 17.57 With regard to municipal law, a survey of constitutions around the world yields 
more than one hundred constitutions that explicitly include the right to a clean natural environment among the 
catalogue of individual rights.58 In addition to these rights, one also finds in constitutions a variety of mandates 
to governments to protect the environment. 
In contraposition, nowhere will one find the act of polluting the natural environment explicitly established as a 
right for any legal person, natural or fictitious, in any international or municipal source of law. Moreover, in the 
United States, many state and federal environmental statutes provide for both civil and criminal sanctions 
against *161 polluters.59 Additionally, the European Court of Justice has annulled a Framework Decision of the 
European Council, and has stated that the European Community legislature has the power to take measures 
relating to the criminal laws of member states,60 which it considers necessary to ensure that the European 
Community rules on environmental protection are fully effective.61 This position regarding penalties is 
consistent with the nature of establishing the right to a clean natural environment for all persons. A violation of 
that right harms not only individuals but also society as a whole, and can thus properly be said to expose a 
polluter to civil liability and criminal sanction. In summary, it would seem rather obvious that societies all over 
the world value clean environments, and reflect this value in international and domestic legal rights to a clean 
environment through prescriptive constitutional rights and criminal and civil proscriptions against pollution. 
Emissions trading is inconsistent with rights to a clean environment (specifically, clean air) and the appurtenant 
duties not to pollute because the necessary underlying theories of contract, tort and property that would be 
needed to enable emissions trading must begin with an assumption that the traders own something of value, 
measured by nothing more than their measurable compliance with a pre-existing duty established by law. It is 
important to note that while the price of a ton of SO2 may be set at a level that the market will bear, the market 
itself is a wholly artificial one, created and maintained by pollution control laws. As Professor Michael Bothe 
reminded the audience at a Sino-German Symposium on Environmental Law, there is no “natural” market for 
the creation, buying and selling of emissions credits.62 
Among other tasks, the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment promulgated the 
Stockholm Declaration. In its first principle, the Declaration states that “Man has the fundamental right to 
freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity 
and well-being . . . .” This principle is not a regulation of the right to a clean environment nor a binding 
statement of positive law, but as Nukhet Turgot points out, it not only names the environmental right, but also 
represents “the first important international document that establishes a link between the human rights concept 
and environmental protection.”63 The same suggestions have been also put forward at international *162 level 
in the form of including a provision on a right to a clean environment into current human rights documents such 
as European Human Rights Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.64 
B. Domestic 
The Public Trust Doctrine 
The umbrella concepts under which much of legal thought on the environment rests are the notion of common 
goods, and the state’s role in maintaining and allocating the use of those common goods for the benefit of the 
public. In his seminal work “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention,”65 Joseph L. Sax explains that if the public trust “doctrine is to provide a satisfactory tool, it must 
meet three criteria. It must contain some concept of a legal right in the general public; it must be enforceable 
against the government; and it must be capable of an interpretation consistent with contemporary concerns for 
  
environmental quality.”66 The source of modern public trust law can be found in a concept “that received much 
attention in Roman and English law--the nature of property rights in rivers, the sea, and the seashore.”67 Sax 
elaborates: 
[T]hree types of restrictions on governmental authority are often thought to be imposed by the 
public trust: first the property subject to the trust must not only be used for a public purpose, but 
it must be held available for use by the general public; second, the property may not be sold, 
even for a fair cash equivalent; and third, the property must be maintained for particular types of 
uses.68 
Constitutions 
Doctrines, however, are not enforceable without recognition in the law. If one begins by looking to 
constitutions, the most fundamental of sources of law since the onset of Westphalian nation-state structures, one 
finds, worldwide, a remarkable number that recognize the right of the legal person to enjoy a healthy or clean 
natural environment.69 In Constitutional Environmental Rights,70 Tim Hayward maintains that a fundamental 
right to an adequate environment ought to be provided in the constitution of any modern democratic state. 
According *163 to Hayward, the importance of securing a provision for environmental protection at the 
constitutional level is now widely recognized.71 Almost all nation’s constitutions drafted after 1970 contain 
some provision regarding environmental protection.72 One can find the right announced in the constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China, and in the constitutions of some EU member states such as Austria, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. A right to a clean environment cannot be found in the constitutive treaties 
of the EU,73 nor has it been placed into the as-yet unratified Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.74 
Whether recognized as a right or simply stated as a duty of the state, environmental protection has also been 
defined as the duty and responsibility of citizens. In this context, the Spanish Constitution formulates this duty 
in terms of “the duty of defense of the environment.”75 The Turkish constitution states that “it is the duty of 
state and citizens to prevent pollution, to protect the health of environment, and to improve the environment.”76 
Although there exists no right to a clean environment in the U.S. Constitution,77 all three branches of the federal 
government considered the notion of the right during the awakening of legal recognition of environmentalism.78 
In his state of the union address on January 22, 1970, President and chief executive Richard M. Nixon defined 
“the great question of the seventies” as how to secure an unpolluted environment as “the birthright of every 
American.”79 In the legislative *164 branch, Senator Gaylord Nelson called for a constitutional amendment 
guaranteeing every American “an inalienable right for a decent environment.”80 In 1965, U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice William O. Douglas published A Wilderness Bill of Rights and, in his 1972 dissent to Sierra Club v. 
Morton,81 stated not only that the right to a clean environment is fundamental, but that the burden of proof in 
the case should have been with the developer, Mineral King, since it proposed action that encroached upon the 
right to a clean environment. That, in his mind, amounted to a “conferral of standing upon environmental 
objects to sue for their own preservation.”82 Although the U.S. Constitution has not yet been interpreted to 
recognize the right to a clean environment, some state constitutions do.83 At least one state constitution, that of 
Pennsylvania,84 has been interpreted as having established a self-executing right85 But even if a constitutional 
right is self-executing, one must consider what a statute might entail if it either creates a right or provides the 
necessary positive statement of law to execute a constitutionally-created right.86 The record of scholarship and 
public debate shows that the question of whether the right needs to be stated in a constitution or in a positive 
statement of law such as a statute or regulation, is however more often hotly debated than whether the right 
exists at all.87 In the history presented by Nash, one might induce a pattern whereby the many ethical rights, 
including race, gender and religion, have become established as legal rights when a series of advocates name 
those rights, and then governments legislate those names into statutes or constitutions.88 
*165 Third Generation Human Rights 
The right to the environment is included in a new category of human rights called “third generation rights.”89 In 
his thorough study of human rights and the environment, Nukhet Turgut summarizes the connection as follows: 
If we analyze the constitutions having provisions on environmental protection we can remark that there are 
three main different formulations about the issue. Firstly some constitutions have only a requirement stating the 
environmental protection as a state goal and duty which are called policy guidelines or programmatic provisions 
by some writers, and are debated as far as their binding effects are concerned. Secondly, there are constitutional 
requirements which explicitly formulate a right to environment. The well-known examples of these kinds of 
formulations are Spanish and Portuguese constitutions. Thirdly some constitutions recognize a right to 
  
environment implicitly (or indirectly) such as the amended 56th article of Turkish Constitution of l982 states 
that “everyone has a right to life in a balanced and healthy environment” which aims and recognizes the right to 
environment indirectly as linking it with the right to life. In this sense there is a similarity between the Turkish 
Constitution and the Stockholm Declaration promulgated at the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment held in l972.90 
Turgut concludes however, that “recognizing the right to environment as a human right is important to protect 
the environment, but it is not sufficient because of differences between the characteristics of this right and 
traditional human rights.”91 
RIGHT TO POLLUTE? 
On the contrary, is there a right to pollute? To understand conceptual bases for the concept of a right to pollute, 
one might begin by considering the historical development of environmental law. Before specific environmental 
rights were written into constitutions, and before pollution prohibitions were written into statutes and 
environmental law, pollution as a legal issue was subsumed under property law and the torts of nuisance and 
trespass. Joseph Sax begins his famous discussion of environmental rights with this historical foundation, but 
strangely, so does M.I.T. economist A. Denny Ellerman, who, while crediting the concept to fellow economist 
Coase in 1960, refers to air as a matter of property of a “common pool” that like land once *166 was, is “free 
for the taking.”92 “In its most general use, a tradable permit can be defined as a transferable right to a common 
pool resource.”93 
Ellerman’s economic discussion is filled with talk of emissions rights. “Allocating emissions rights is a 
prerequisite of allowance trading only, although rights to emit are implicit in both credit trading and averaging, 
as they are in conventional environmental permits.”94 These, however, are not rights; rather, they are licenses, 
and as with all licenses, can only be exercised when the government’s conditions are met. If the government is 
treating the air as part of the right of citizens, then the protection of the air, in the public trust, cannot be sold by 
the government, nor licensed for sale by the government. The so-called “common pool” resource that Ellerman 
uses by analogy is land, but land historically has not been permitted to be used as though there is an absolute 
individual and independent right. Most recently, the dozens of states that had had “right to farm” statutes have 
seen those statutes fall. 
The public and the media recognize this without resorting to the mathematics of economics: 
The Public Trust Doctrine is simple: Wisconsin holds its waters in trust for the public, and the 
rights of the public are paramount to any private use of state waters. . . . But if a grower creates a 
public nuisance by harming public trust waters, the attorney general has a duty to protect the 
public interest by going to court to right the wrong. The highest law of our state is the state 
constitution--and where the Public Trust Doctrine is concerned, both the Right to Farm Law and 
the Cranberry Law must yield to it.95 
These restrictions on use are balanced by the favorite tools of private property interests, the takings clause and 
the related argument of reverse condemnation. At the end of the 1990s, Jerry Taylor, director of natural resource 
studies at the Cato Institute, asked whether farmers in the United States, for instance, have a right to pollute.96 
He answered himself with reference to the anti-environmental lobbyists in the 1990s who countered pollution 
regulation with invented property *167 rights arguments such as “reverse condemnation,” made famous in the 
case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.97 
Those arguments made for some surprising political bedfellows when, in 1995, the County Board of 
Supervisors of Kossuth County, Iowa “reclassified a residential neighborhood as an ‘agricultural area’ and 
allowed a large-scale hog operation to start up next to a number of homes.”98 Hog farmers in Iowa were 
protected from nuisance actions that might be filed due to the stench by Iowa’s right to farm statute. Property 
owners argued reverse condemnation. Holding the right-to-farm statute unconstitutional, the Iowa Supreme 
Court opined: “When all the varnish is removed, the challenged statutory scheme amounts to a commandeering 
of valuable property rights without compensating the owners, and sacrificing those rights for the economic 
advantage of a few.”99 After the U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear the case on appeal, the Iowa law was 
repealed. Taylor suggests that the case puts every other state’s right-to-farm law in question: 
Advocates for expanded property rights heralded the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Commission as the dawn of a new era in which landowners would obtain 
increased constitutional compensation for the burdens of regulation, and which in turn would 
  
discourage regulatory initiatives. The post-Lucas era has been a considerable disappointment to 
property rights advocates, however. Ensuing decisions have confined the categorical takings rule 
to regulations that result in complete economic wipeouts, a rare phenomenon. On the other hand, 
courts have expansively interpreted the decision’s exemption from compensation for regulations 
that merely forbid uses prohibited by background principles of property and nuisance law. In 
fact, a dozen or more categorical defenses have evolved under the Lucas decision’s background 
principles inquiry. Thus, surprisingly enough, Lucas’s chief effect has been to make the nature of 
the claimant’s property interest a threshold issue in all takings cases. Instead of increasing the 
likelihood of either landowner compensation or deregulation, Lucas’s principal legacy lies in 
affording government defendants numerous effective categorical defenses with which to defeat 
takings claims.100 
*168 More generally, while one might conclude that while environmental rights might be included among 
property rights, a right to pollute is not included within the concept of a property right. The public use and Fifth 
Amendment takings issues continue to catch the attention of the United States Supreme Court. In Kelo v. City 
of New London101 the Court held that the city’s taking of private property to sell for private development 
qualified as a “public use” within the meaning of the takings clause. The city was not taking the land simply to 
benefit a certain group of private individuals, but was following an economic development plan. Such 
justifications for land takings, the majority argued, should be given deference. The takings here qualified as 
“public use” despite the fact that the land was not going to be used by the public. The Fifth Amendment did not 
require “literal” public use, the majority said, but the “broader and more natural interpretation of public use as 
‘public purpose.”’102 
CAN EMISSIONS TRADING SURVIVE THE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL ETHICS? 
It remains disputed among scholars as to how and when rights, as a manifestation of justice and ethical 
positions, become recognized as law.103 In his study of the history of the rights of nature, Roderick Frazier 
Nash provides a number of moments in legal history when attempts have been made to extend legal rights to 
entities beyond living persons, such as future persons and trees.104 Within that history are the more modest 
attempts to establish or recognize those rights,105 depending upon one’s sense of the fundamental nature of the 
source of law. 
The ethics of emissions trading need to be made explicit before the legal bases can be fully considered. The tacit 
adoption of a teleological approach to air pollution regulation results in a situation whereby simply complying 
with a state-created privilege creates a private property right that can be sold on the open market. Bolling’s 
cartoon demonstrates the need to consider the distinction between deontological and teleological approaches to 
creating legal rights, privileges and *169 duties. Whereas a teleological approach allows ends (Greek, telos, 
“end”) to justify means, non-consequentialist theories such as a deontological one (Greek, deontos, “duty”) 
focus upon individual acts that constitute the means. A simpler, but perhaps less effective analogy might be to 
suggest that if one drives his or her automobile slower than a posted speed limit of sixty-five miles per hour, he 
or she could obtain speed credits for the miles per hour under sixty-five and sell those credits to other drivers 
who just “can’t drive sixty-five,” thus permitting those other drivers to exceed sixty-five without penalty. 
If there is no right to pollute, upon what legitimation does emissions trading rest? Although we may not often 
examine the foundation upon which a legal prescription or proscription rests, we engage the practice and study 
of the law as though each prescription and proscription does indeed have a legitimate foundation. The Air 
Pollution Control Act clearly says that the creation of an emissions credit is not a property right.106 
Basic contract law tells us that “where a party does or promises to do what he is already legally obligated to do 
or promises to refrain from doing or refrains from doing what he is not legally privileged to do he has not 
incurred detriment”107 because it was a pre-existing duty. Moreover, the pre-existing duty need not be 
contractual, but may be set by civil or criminal law. Without a new duty upon which the parties agree, there is a 
failure of consideration and thus a failure of contract.108 
The argument in favor of emissions trading must assume that under any given “meteorological-juridical 
bubble”, including a worldwide model, there will be a net reduction in emissions, either under the bubble or 
worldwide, even if some polluters are in fact permitted or encouraged to pollute more in the process, so long as 
offset credits are available and affordable.109 Moreover, the E.U. has taken advantage of its regional integration 
and insisted upon the inclusion of Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol. Under Article 4, Annex I parties that have 
  
reached an agreement to fulfill their commitments under Article 3 jointly “shall be deemed to have met those 
commitments, provided that their total combined aggregate emissions do not exceed their assigned amounts 
calculated pursuant to their quantified emission reduction and limitation commitments inscribed n Annex B to 
the Protocol.”110 Such an arrangement has been called the joint implementation “bubble.”111 In considering this 
assumption, if one focuses upon the term “net,” it becomes evident that the emissions-trading *170 process 
justifies its means by further assuming its ends, or what philosophers might term setting a bias in favor of a 
teleological rather than a deontological approach to the right to a clean environment versus the putative property 
right to pollute with the allowance of an emissions-trading credit. These circumstances further emphasize the 
unsubstantiated assumptions of emissions trading if one considers duties, the necessary counterpart of all rights. 
Alternatively, as any beginning student of the law learns, for every right established there exists a corresponding 
duty. As applied, that would mean for example that “[a]ccording to rights and duties theories, the question of 
the moral acceptability of US greenhouse gas emissions does not turn on the probability that harm would occur 
but rather on whether one is engaged in behavior that one has a duty to avoid.”112 When applied to emissions 
trading, it demands that because a right to a clean environment exists as a statement of positive law, a 
corresponding duty exists among others not to pollute. At the level of individual or governmental action, one 
would therefore need to determine whether the act being considered is inherently wrong, as understood within 
the constitutional prescriptions to a clean environment and the statutory proscriptions on pollution. One may go 
one step further and extend the act of air pollution to the category of all similarly-situated legal persons, thus 
asking, per the deontology of Kant,113 whether such behavior can be made universal. Of course not.114 In other 
words, could all industries of the type in question, such as electric power plants, exceed their statutory or permit 
limits? With emissions trading, the assumption is that some persons will comply with the law, creating an 
additional property right which can then be sold to those who do not comply with the law. Rather than the 
determination of how many persons may exceed their statutory or permit limits, as determined by human health 
or environmental concerns, it is based upon the illusory pure marketplace. 
One might counter the deontological critique of the teleological approach, however, by arguing that the 
deontological approach would stop most industry, assuming that it is only possible for industry to operate by 
causing at least some air pollution. That response is overly broad for the issues at hand. Specifically, one can 
see the ramifications of a teleologically-biased rights assumption by looking directly to Article 17 of the Kyoto 
Protocol.115 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries assume voluntary emissions limitations. Some 
non-governmental organizations and developing countries argued “that the targets should be based on a set per 
capita emissions level, arguing that this is the most equitable and *171 enduring system because all citizens of 
the world would have the same “right” to emit.”116 Now that the United States, China, Europe, and the Kyoto 
signatories have established emissions trading, however, little discussion of the assumptions concerning the 
basic rights and duties takes place. Instead, governments and non-governmental organizations ruminate upon 
such issues as the Kyoto Protocol Article 17’s condition that emissions trading flexible mechanisms be 
“supplemental” to countries’ attempts to curb emissions, whereas “clean development mechanisms” in Kyoto 
Protocol article 12.2 need not be supplemental. Other such issues include verification of credit purchase values, 
counterfeit emission reduction units, discounting, insurance, minimum thresholds for banking, and liability for 
the over sale of credits,117 windfall profits,118 and political fairness.119 
As Bothe has noted, emission trading under the U.N.F.C.C.C. and Kyoto Protocol appears to be a mechanism 
involving transactions among the states that are parties to the Protocol. The parties “may participate in emission 
trading for the purpose of fulfilling their commitments.”120 Such a suggestion ignores the differing duties and 
hence, the attitude in application between states and private enterprises. The market goals of efficiency and 
monetary cost-reduction may be better fit to private industry, but the relationship of a set goal to the search for 
an efficient achievement of that goal is a trick that places the rabbit in the hat, exposing an assumption 
regarding duties rather than rights. Given a market goal, a market industry is well suited. But neither the Kyoto 
Protocol nor the constitutional framework of any of the three systems under consideration has stated that the 
goal of emissions trading is to produce a commodity market. Were this the case, the duty with which we would 
be concerned would be a fiduciary one, as evidenced by the articles of incorporation of any of the industries 
involved. But when states are the parties to emissions trading, the trader has more than a fiduciary duty; it has 
the moral and legal duties that arise out of the public trust, as evidenced by the Kyoto Protocol and domestic 
constitutions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
  
A range of conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. For those who continue to favor emissions trading, due 
consideration to the *172 questionable nature of the underlying property rights must be considered in order to 
avert defeat if an established emissions trading system is challenged. For those who do not favor emissions 
trading, the weak nature of the underlying property assumptions provides the foundation from which a 
challenge can be mounted. While environmentalists may want to resist the idea that anyone owns nature, the 
record of events in the emissions trading history of the last forty years demonstrates that silence is a luxury that 
cannot be afforded.121 
If we accept the assertion that even within the emission trading community, only cap and trade systems have a 
performance record that justifies the teleological assumption that net worldwide emissions reductions will 
result, then only a system that is based upon a regulatory standard is possible. Regulatory standards are not 
produced by market economics. Thus, if the only way emissions trading works is with a role for government, 
then the government must also manage the public interest in the common good that is clean air. The United 
States’ programs, being generally regarded as the oldest and having been expressly used as the models for other 
programs, have elements of both the cap-and-trade and emissions credit trading systems. Even emissions 
trading supporters, however, must admit that only cap-and-trade has achieved its intended consequences. This 
crucial distinction has not been keenly observed when the systems are adapted and adopted elsewhere, and, 
unfortunately, it is precisely the emissions credit trading system that fails the most in ethical analysis. The 
differences elucidated by Byron Swift122 matter---without an ethical basis that fits an emissions system into a 
legal enforcement regimen, the system cannot be justified. 
What way forward with flexibility mechanisms? It is unlikely that emissions trading will go away, even if it is 
recognized or admitted that it is premised upon an unfounded assumption that a right to pollute exists and can 
be turned into a tangible property right. But even if the cow has gone, the barn door may still need to be closed. 
“Environmental compliance and enforcement are the foundation for the rule of law, good governance, and 
sustainable development,” says Kenneth *173 J. Markowitz of the secretariat of the International Network for 
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement (I.N.E.C.E.).123 He adds that only a relatively small part of the 
regulated community chooses economic incentives not to comply with environmental regulation. Thus, if there 
is non-compliance, it would likely be the result of other reasons. Since those who will benefit most from 
effective measures to halt the greenhouse effect will not necessarily be the same as those who would have to 
bear most of the cost for these measures, it is impossible to rely entirely on the informed self-interest of those 
polluters in order to achieve the purposes of reducing or slowing global warming.124 Thus, at an International 
Conference in 2004 and an Enforcement of Emissions Trading Workshop (7th Conference, 2005), the 
I.N.E.C.E. “recognized that credibility of an emissions trading system is dependent upon compliance and 
enforcement.”125 
In his lengthy study of international trade and its effects on human rights and the environment, Francesco 
Francioni concludes that “[i]n the absence of a world government capable of functioning as a global arbiter in 
resolving conflicts between trade and non-commercial interests, stakes must inevitably address such conflicts on 
the basis of principles and methods which are typical of the decentralized structure of international law. These 
methods must include international cooperation for appropriate standard-setting, diplomatic negotiation and 
binding adjudication, and as a last resort, unilateral State action.”126 
“The movement toward the adoption of international human rights standards predates the effort to establish a 
global system of free trade. As early as 1919, with the constitution of the International Labor Organization, 
social and economic rights began to develop. . . . Its legacy proved to be relevant in the early formulation of the 
instruments designed to set up and govern the institutions of the UN.”127 
According to neo-conservative supporters of emissions trading: 
Critics also argue that emissions trading does little to solve pollution problems overall, as groups 
that do not pollute sell their conservation to the highest bidder. Overall reductions would need to 
come from a reduction of permits available in the system. Likely this would occur over time 
through central regulation, though some environmental groups acted more immediately by 
buying credits and refusing to use or sell them.128 Nevertheless, the transfer of wealth from 
polluters *174 to non-polluters, provides incentives for polluting firms to change, especially if 
the market price for pollution credits is very high.129 
Note that even in this formulation of the assumptions, central regulation would be required to make equitable 
use of the market. It is not a pure market; it is not an open market. 
  
Concluding with the cartoon image with which this article opens, one is reminded of the nature of the emissions 
“market.” It is not a natural market, but one that is artificially constructed only through government legislation 
that creates a property right.130 This point is made not out of a general agoraphobia, but rather to demonstrates 
that only after that right is created does the market operate come into play, and then largely to agree upon the 
prices. A comparison of the deontological with the teleological approaches in answering the title question yields 
differing results. A deontological approach would make it difficult to justify the act of polluting, given that 
there is no underlying right to do so, and given that there is in fact a duty not to do so, established by the rights 
to a clean environment. If one can provide some degree of certainty as to the assumptions that must be built into 
the bubble models of geographic and meteorological systems, and the human behavior within them, then the 
end, net or telos of the system should be lower air pollution. 
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